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LIFE AND LIBERTY:  SEVEN FACTORS
THAT WILL BETTER EVALUATE SELF-
DEFENSE IN NEVADA’S COMMON
LAW ON RETREAT
Robert Stephens*
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife.  There-
fore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in that situation
should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly
with safety or disable his assailant rather than to kill him.1
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, United States Supreme Court
I. INTRODUCTION
Although self-defense in Nevada originally developed under the common
law, the Nevada Legislature has adopted a statute of self-defense to protect
victims from imminent death or great bodily harm.2  Nevada judges have inter-
preted the self-defense statute to mean that victims, or non-aggressors, need not
retreat from danger presented by an assailant, but instead have a right to kill
their assailant.3  This view has become known as the no-retreat doctrine.4  The
doctrine has many advantages, such as simple application; however, it does not
clearly evaluate the necessity of killing a person because it does not require the
non-aggressor to pursue other options to preserve his own life before killing his
aggressor.5
This Note will discuss seven factors Nevada should adopt to evaluate bet-
ter the necessity of using lethal force in self-defense.  First, this Note will
briefly explain the history of the self-defense doctrine, focusing specifically on
the doctrine of retreat.  Next, the Note will briefly discuss the three different
* J.D. Candidate 2008, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas;
B.A. 2005, Brigham Young University.  I thank the many family members who provided
insight, direction, and suggestions into this Note.  I extend a special thanks to my wife,
Diane Stephens, for her continuing love, motivation, and support throughout law school.
1 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200 (2007).
3 State v. Grimmett, 112 P. 273 (Nev. 1910) (holding that a non-aggressor “need not flee for
safety, but has the right to stand his ground and slay his adversary”).
4 Wilmeth v. State, 610 P.2d 735, 738 (Nev. 1980).
5 Grimmett, 112 P. at 273.  The Nevada Supreme Court stated that this was a “clear case of
self-defense. . . .  [I]t was necessary for the defendant to kill him in order to preserve his own
[life].”  The fact finder only must determine whether it was necessary for defendant to kill
his assailant to preserve his own life.  There is no requirement to determine whether defen-
dant could have pursued other means before killing his aggressor.
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doctrines of retreat along with the reasons and benefits of applying each doc-
trine.  Then, the Note will review the history of self-defense in Nevada fol-
lowed by an introduction and discussion of seven factors that will better aid
Nevada in evaluating the necessity of self-defense.  Finally, the Note will
address both the impacts of implementing such factors and some concerns these
proposed factors might present.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SELF-DEFENSE
Our Founding Fathers declared that people shall not “be deprived of life,
liberty, or property.”6  Since 1791, when the states ratified the Bill of Rights,
and even well before that for the colonies, each state comprising the United
States has had the difficult task of defining under which circumstances a person
may use lethal force to protect his life, liberty, and property.7  “There is gener-
ally no dispute that deadly force may be used in self-defense to protect oneself
from death or serious bodily injury . . . .”8  However, states disagree as to the
circumstances for determining when a person is truly in danger of death or
serious bodily injury thereby permitting that person to protect himself, and if
necessary, to kill his assailant in self-defense.9
A. History of Self-Defense from England to the United States of America
Beginning no later than the reign of Edward I, homicide was only justified
when “‘committed in execution of the law.’  In all other cases . . . the defendant
was not justified.”10  As punishment, the king would take all the killer’s chat-
tels and imprison him.11  The sole means to avoid this punishment was to
obtain the king’s pardon.12  Eventually the king permitted his chancellors to
issue pardons.13  Later, in 1532, Henry VIII eliminated the requirement for
English citizens to obtain a pardon from the chancellor by enacting a statute
that enabled a defendant to claim self-defense during his trial.14
In England, two ideas of self-defense evolved:  justifiable self-defense and
excusable self-defense.15  However, the distinction between the two types of
self-defense has become more intermingled and “blurred” because several dif-
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7 Because the Constitution does not specifically delegate the power to govern the doctrine of
self-defense to the federal government, via the Tenth Amendment, each state has this power.
Id. amend. X.
8 Michelle Jaffe, Note, Up in Arms over Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law, 30
NOVA L. REV. 155, 158 (2005).
9 See Steven P. Aggergaard, Note, Criminal Law—Retreat from Reason:  How Minnesota’s
New No-Retreat Rule Confuses the Law and Cries for Alteration—State v. Glowacki, 29
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657 (2002).
10 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 158 (quoting Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from Murderous
Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1902)).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 158-59.
14 Id. at 159; see also Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinter-
pretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381, 387 (1960) (citing 24 Henry VIII, c. 5).
15 See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 159.  Although there is a slight distinction between justifiable
and excusable self-defense, the distinction is not important in determining whether Nevada
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ferent courts, including state courts in the United States, began to interpret self-
defense differently and hence the terms began to mean the same thing.16
The one point of law that remained clear and consistent was that the
defendant, to claim self-defense, must have acted with “a reasonable and honest
belief in the imminent danger of death or grave bodily harm.”17  The vast
majority of jurisdictions require the defendant to prove the following:  (1) the
defendant only used force against an aggressor, (2) the defendant’s use of force
was necessary, (3) the defendant’s use of force was proportional to the aggres-
sor’s use of force, and (4) the aggressor’s attack was imminent.18
Today, legal scholars tend to focus their debates of self-defense upon the
necessity and reasonableness of the defendant’s actions.19  One hotly debated
issue related to necessity and reasonableness is whether a defendant has a duty
to retreat to the wall before defending himself with deadly force.20
B. Three Theories to Determine Self-Defense
1. Duty to Retreat
The duty to retreat requires the defendant to prove that he retreated “to the
wall” and that his killing was necessary to save a life or prevent serious bodily
injury.21  This theory is rooted in English common law and adopted by the
Model Penal Code.22  Twenty-four states have adopted the “duty to retreat”
doctrine requiring the defendant to prove that he could not have left the scene
safely before killing his aggressor.23
should adopt the seven factors suggested in this Note.  The important point is that self-
defense was beginning to take slightly different forms.
16 Id.
17 Monique M. Gousie, Comment, From Self-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v. State Use
of Battered Woman’s Syndrome to Defend Wife’s Involvement in Third-Party Murder, 28
NEW ENG. L. REV. 453, 455 (1993), quoted in Jaffe, supra note 8, at 159.
18 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 158.
19 Id. at 159; see also Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 663.
20 See generally Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 659-93 (discussing whether a co-resident has
a duty to retreat); Jaffe, supra note 8, at 160-81 (discussing the reaction to Florida’s recently
enacted law eliminating a defendant’s duty to retreat).
21 Jaffe, supra note 8, at 160 (quoting RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT:
VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 3-4 (1991)).
22 State v. Grimmett, 112 P. 273, 273 (Nev. 1910).
The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . if . . . the actor knows that he can avoid the
necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of
a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he
abstain from any action that he has no duty to take . . . .
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (2001).
23 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662.  In his article, Aggergaard reports that twenty-nine
states follow the majority view.  Those numbers were accurate in 2002; however, since
Aggergaard’s note was published only twenty-four states now follow the duty to retreat
doctrine.  These states include the following:  Arkansas, Ricketts v. State, 729 S.W.2d 400
(Ark. 1987); Colorado, People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341 (Colo. 2000); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-19 (2007); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (2007); Iowa, State v.
Sedig, 16 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1944); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (2007);
Maryland, Dawson v. State, 395 A.2d 160 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Massachusetts, Com-
monwealth v. Toon, 773 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Michigan, People v. Couch, 211
N.W.2d 250 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Minnesota, State v. Edwards, 717 N.W.2d 405 (Minn.
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These jurisdictions believe that “‘[a]ll human life, even that of an aggres-
sor should be preserved if at all possible.’”24  This “triumph of civility”25 the-
ory allows lethal self-defense only as the non-aggressor’s last resort.  They
conclude that lethal force is only reasonable and necessary when the defendant
reasonably believes that “he had ‘no choice’ but to kill.”26
2. Stand Your Ground
Twenty-five states, including Nevada,27 accept the “true-man” or “stand-
your-ground”28 doctrine, which rejects the duty to retreat rule.29  This theory
says that a person need not retreat when his life is threatened by an aggressor,
but instead may use deadly force to prevent his death or great bodily harm.30
This theory of self-defense believes that “victims need not yield their rights,
surrender their dignity, or reveal their weak side to aggressive wrongdoers.”31
This theory of self-defense began to gain prominence in 1876 when the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the law
will not permit the taking of [life] to repel a mere trespass, or even to save life, where
the assault is provoked; but a true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly
2006); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409 (2007); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 627:4 (2007); New Jersey, State v. Rodriguez, 920 A.2d 101 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2007); New York, People v. Chung, 835 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 2007); North Caro-
lina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (2007); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (2007);
Ohio, State v. Walker, 598 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Oklahoma, Walston v. State,
597 P.2d 768 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874
A.2d 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Rhode Island, State v. Silvia, 836 A.2d 197 (R.I. 2003);
South Carolina, Gilchrist v. State, 612 S.E.2d 702 (S.C. 2005); South Dakota, State v.
Stumbaugh, 132 N.W. 666 (S.D. 1911); Vermont, State v. Albano, 102 A. 333 (Vt. 1917);
and Wyoming, Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420 (Wyo. 1984).
24 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662 (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 227 (3d ed. 2001)).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 663 (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 856-65 (1978)).
27 These twenty-five states include the following:  Alabama, ALA CODE § 13A-3-23 (1975);
Alaska, ALASKA. STAT. § 11.81.335 (2007); Arizona, State v. Palomarez, 657 P.2d 899
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); California, People v. McFearson, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App.
2008); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005); Georgia, McClendon v. State, 651 S.E.2d 165
(Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304 (2007); Idaho, State v.
McGreevey, 105 P. 1047 (Idaho 1909); Illinois, People v. White, 819 N.E.2d 1239 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004); Indiana, IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(a) (2006); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3211
(2006); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.050 (2007); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:20 (2007); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2007); Missouri, MO. REV. STAT.
§ 563.031 (2007); Montana, State v. Merk, 164 P. 655 (Mont. 1917); Nevada, Runion v.
State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000); New Mexico, State v. Horton, 258 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1953);
Oregon, State v. Gray, 79 P. 53 (Or. 1905); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611
(2007); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 2007); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
2-402 (2007); Virginia, Graham v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 2000);
Washington, State v. Hiatt, 60 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1936); and West Virginia, State v. Donahue,
90 S.E. 834 (W. Va. 1916).
28 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662.
29 Id. at 661.
30 Id.  Between 1949 and 1990 it was not clear what standard was used, but the true-man
doctrine was never abandoned. See Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 241 n.2 (Nev. 1990).
31 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 661.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-2\NVJ205.txt unknown Seq: 5  4-APR-08 14:33
Winter 2008] LIFE AND LIBERTY 653
from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or
do him enormous bodily harm.32
These “stand-your-ground” jurisdictions believe that “[r]equiring retreat
. . . put[s] innocent people at risk as they escape an aggressor bolstered by
apparently successful dominance.”33  The “true-man doctrine” justifies self-
defense when “killing [was] necessary because personal liberties [had] been
threatened.”34
3. Middle Ground
The middle ground theory attempts to find a balance between the necessity
of the non-aggressor to protect his life and liberty, and the value of the aggres-
sor’s life.35  Two jurisdictions, the District of Columbia36 and Wisconsin,37
have attempted to appease both theories of retreat.38  Within these jurisdictions,
juries or courts analyze “the possibility of escape” and “opportunity to retreat”
to determine whether deadly force was necessary and reasonable.39  The
Supreme Court upheld this standard in Brown v. United States,40 holding that
“failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the others in order
to determine whether the defendant went farther than he was justified in doing;
not a categorical proof of guilt.”41  This retreat doctrine takes a middle ground
approach, neither accepting nor rejecting the two differing views previously
mentioned.42  Instead, the “middle ground theory” assesses the opportunity to
retreat as a factor to determine the necessity and reasonableness of the killing in
self-defense.43
C. Castle Doctrine
Although this Note will not analyze the castle doctrine in depth, it should
be mentioned in more than a mere footnote that all courts, including the
Supreme Court,44 follow the “castle doctrine.”45  This common law doctrine
permits the non-aggressor to use lethal force in his home when his life is endan-
gered, even when retreating in complete safety is possible.46  Courts have
upheld the use of lethal force while in your home to protect yourself because it
32 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (1876), quoted in Jaffe supra note 8, at 161.
33 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 661-62.
34 Id. at 663.
35 Id.
36 Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979).
37 State v. Watkins, 647 N.W.2d 244 (Wis. 2002); see also State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d
467, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
38 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662-63.
39 Id. at 663.
40 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
41 Id. at 343.
42 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662-63.
43 See Jaffe, supra note 8, at 166-67.
44 Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 560 (1895).
45 See Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 664.
46 Id. at 664-65.
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is assumed that there is no safer place for the non-aggressor to flee to than his
own home.47
There is some debate among different jurisdictions as to how far the castle
doctrine should be extended, for example, whether a mobile home, an automo-
bile, or one’s own yard is considered a person’s “castle.”48  The importance of
the castle doctrine, with respect to this Note, is that every jurisdiction allows a
person to kill an intruder if that person is in his own home and reasonably
believes his life is in danger.49
D. History of Self-Defense and Retreat in Nevada
Nevada follows the true-man doctrine.50  This permits a person to kill his
aggressor if it is more reasonable for the non-aggressor to take the aggressor’s
life, even though retreat is possible.51  Even though this has been the standard
since 1910,52 it has developed.  The Nevada Supreme Court first addressed
self-defense in 1910 while deciding State v. Grimmett.53  In this case, Grimmett
approached Baker and asked him for $7.50, which Baker owed him.54  Baker
became violent, grabbed a pool cue, and charged Grimmett.55  Baker was ini-
tially restrained but ran to the bar, where he grabbed a revolver and shot at
Grimmett.56  Grimmett returned fire, killing Baker.57  The Court held:
[W]here a person, without voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or willingly
engaging in a difficulty of his own free will, is attacked by an assailant, and it is
necessary for him to take the life of his assailant to protect his own, then he need not
flee for safety, but has the right to stand his ground and slay his adversary.58
In a one-page decision, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected the duty to retreat
doctrine and accepted the true-man doctrine.59
47 Id. “The rationale is that a person in her own home has already retreated ‘to the wall,’ as
there is no place to which she can further flee in safety.”  State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339,
1343 (Ohio 1997).
48 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 665; see also State v. Borwick, 187 N.W. 460, 463 (Iowa
1922) (“When [a person] takes his family or friends or guests into his car and drives out
upon the public street, we think it no undue stretch of the principle to hold that the car is (in
a restricted sense, perhaps) for the time being his castle . . . .”); State v. Baird, 640 N.W.2d
363, 369-70 (Minn. Ct. App.) (ordering new trial when jurors were instructed that co-
residents had a duty to retreat from a motor home), aff’d, 654 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. 2002);
State v. Frizzelle, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (N.C. 1955) (“[T]he curtilage of the home will ordina-
rily be construed to include at least the yard around the dwelling house as well as the area
occupied by barns, cribs, and other outbuildings.”); State v. Marsh, 593 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990) (“[F]or purposes of a duty to retreat, a tent and a home are the logical
equivalent of each other.”).
49 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 664-65.
50 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1990).
51 Quillen v. State, 929 P.2d 893, 900 n.7 (Nev. 1996).
52 State v. Grimmett, 112 P. 273, 273 (Nev. 1910).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See id.
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In 1931, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified and distinguished its holding
in Grimmett by requiring people who begin quarrels to attempt to retreat before
killing another person.60  In State v. Robison,61 Mr. Robison was living with
his friend, Mr. Rowland, for a while because his wife, Mrs. Robison, was
troubled by Mr. Robison’s drinking.62  After a Legion meeting on September
11, 1931, Mr. Robison returned to Mr. Rowland’s home, where the two men
commenced drinking a considerable amount of “moonshine whiskey.”63  After
several drinks, Mr. Rowland told Mr. Robison that he picked up Mrs. Robison
and took her home earlier that day.64  An argument ensued that eventually
turned into a grapple.65  Mr. Rowland “pointed his left finger at [the] defendant
and reached back quickly with his right hand to his right hip pocket.”66  Mr.
Robison “immediately drew his gun,” but shots were not immediately
exchanged.67  After more wrestling, Mr. Robison shot and killed Mr.
Rowland.68
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld Mr. Robison’s homicide conviction,
stating that Mr. Robison’s actions were “to provoke a continuance of the
assault.”69  “If he is at fault in bringing on the encounter, before he can justify
the killing it must appear that he had in good faith endeavored to decline any
further struggle before the mortal blow was given.”70
Following the Robison decision, district courts began to give jury instruc-
tions requiring the jury to determine whether the defendant made a “reasonable
effort” to avoid killing his assailant before administering the mortal blow.71  By
1950, Nevada courts were beginning to adhere more closely to the principles of
a duty to retreat jurisdiction.72
One example is in State v. Helm.73  Helm’s employer directed Helm, a
special police officer, to purchase a ticket to New York for another employee,
Ferroni.74  Helm visited Ferroni to discuss travel plans and purchase a ticket to
New York.75  Ferroni disagreed with Helm’s suggested travel plans to go
through Salt Lake City en route to New York.76  The argument escalated to a
60 See State v. Robison, 6 P.2d 433 (Nev. 1931).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 434.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 435.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 438.
70 Id. at 439.
71 See id. at 438.
72 For example, in 1949 the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a district court decision, which
issued jury instructions requiring the defendant, who was not the aggressor, to make a “rea-
sonable effort” to retreat before killing his aggressor.  State v. Helm, 209 P.2d 187, 198
(Nev. 1949).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 192.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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point where Ferroni swung a knife at Helm.77  During the struggle, Helm struck
Ferroni on the head with a gun and shot him at least once.78  Ferroni attempted
to escape but was stopped by other police officers.79  After informing the police
officers that Helm was trying to kill him, Ferroni was able to head towards an
exit.80  The police officers attempted to persuade Helm not to shoot Ferroni,
but Helm shot two or three more times, killing Ferroni, who was only a few
feet from the exit.81
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Helm’s conviction for first-degree
murder for failing to make reasonable effort to retreat.82  This decision slightly
obscured the law because, after this case, courts could issue jury instructions
that required a non-aggressor defendant to make reasonable efforts to retreat,
which was contrary to the precedent established in Grimmett.83
The Nevada Supreme Court did not clarify the law on self-defense until
1990, in Culverson v. State.84  Because of conflicting testimony by three wit-
nesses, the only Culverson facts that are clear are that Culverson, Smith,
Thomas, and Broadus were seeking drugs and that Culverson shot Smith.85
Two people testified that Culverson acted in self-defense because Smith pulled
out a gun first, and one testified that Culverson pulled his gun first.86
The Nevada Supreme Court held that “a person, who is not the original
aggressor, has no duty to retreat before using deadly force, if a reasonable per-
son in the position of the non-aggressor would believe that his assailant is about
to kill him or cause him serious bodily harm.”87  The paramount fact the court
must determine is whether the defendant was the original aggressor.88  If the
defendant was the original aggressor, only then must he make reasonable
efforts to retreat before he can use deadly force to defend himself.89  If the
defendant was attacked without deadly provocation or encouragement of his
own, then there is no requirement to retreat.90  “Nevada does not require a
person to retreat when he reasonably believes that he is about to be attacked
with deadly force.”91  The court believed that a rule requiring a non-aggressor
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 192-93.
82 Id. at 200.
83 Compare State v. Grimmett, 112 P. 273 (Nev. 1910), with State v. Robison, 6 P.2d 433
(Nev. 1931), and Helm, 209 P.2d 187.  It seems clear that Helm would have been convicted
of murder in almost every jurisdiction, but rather than focusing on the fact that he used
disproportionate force (using a gun when the original aggressor only had a knife), the
Nevada Supreme Court decided to focus on Helm’s reasonable efforts to retreat and avoid
the conflict all together.
84 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1990).
85 Id. at 239.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 240-41.  It is also worth mentioning that note 2 in the Culverson opinion reads, “To
the extent that Helm is inconsistent with our holding in this case, it is overruled.” Id. at 241
n.2.
88 Id. at 240.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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to retreat confers a benefit on the aggressor because it is difficult for the non-
aggressor to determine whether he can safely retreat.92  Further, the non-
aggressor should be able to avoid the appearance of cowardice.93
None of the justices dissented, but not all the justices agreed with this
distinction.94  Justice Rose, in a concurring opinion, argued that every person
should retreat if possible to do so in “complete safety.”95  Justice Rose believed
that saving one life, even the life of the aggressor, is more valuable than
“avoiding the appearance of cowardice.”96  It is the state’s responsibility to
exact justice and punishment, not the non-aggressor’s responsibility.97  Lastly,
Justice Rose maintained that because self-defense is based upon necessity, it is
not necessary for a person to kill another if there is a possibility of escaping in
complete safety.98  “Whether a person should reasonably know that he or she
can retreat with complete safety will be determined after examination of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the attack, including but not limited to
the immediate excitement which is caused by the attack.”99  Justice Rose was
arguing for a lesser standard than the true-man doctrine; however, subsequent
cases and statutes in Nevada have not adopted his position on self-defense and
the duty of retreat.100
III. PROPOSED MIDDLE GROUND FACTORS
The questions that Nevada must answer are (1) how important or valuable
is a person’s liberty in comparison to a person’s life and (2) how do Nevada
courts balance these interests to sustain society’s values.  Nevada tends to favor
a person’s liberty more than an aggressor’s life because if follows the true-man
doctrine, which permits the non-aggressor to use lethal force when his life is
reasonably threatened to protect his liberty.101  If Nevada believes an aggres-
sor’s life is more important than a person’s liberty, then Nevada should change
its laws to enforce the duty to retreat because under the duty to retreat the non-
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 241 (Rose, J., concurring, with whom Springer, J., agrees).
95 Id. at 242.
96 Id.
97 Id.; see also Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 662.
98 Culverson, 797 P.2d at 242.
99 Id.
100 Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200 (2007).  The statute requires the defendant to
prove self-defense by showing that (1) “[t]he danger was so urgent and pressing that, in
order to save his own life, or to prevent his receiving great bodily harm, the killing of the
other was absolutely necessary;” and (2) “[t]he person killed was the assailant, or that the
slayer had really, and in good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle before the
mortal blow was given.” See Earl v. State, 904 P.2d 1029 (Nev. 1995).  A person who
reasonably believes that he is about to be killed or seriously injured need not retreat before
using deadly force. See Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000).
101 Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 663.  “[W]here defenders may stand their ground, killing is
necessary because personal liberty has been threatened.”
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aggressor may only kill his aggressor if there are no reasonable and safe means
to escape the conflict.102
This Part of the Note will briefly discuss the advantages and disadvantages
of using a factor test and then suggest some factors that Nevada should adopt to
balance life and liberty better.103  Finally, this Part will address some of the
major concerns that might arise if Nevada adopted the suggested factors.
A. The Advantages of the “Middle Ground” Theory for Self-Defense
Nevada should adopt a “middle ground” theory because hard fast lines do
not allow for varying discretion based on the particular circumstances.104
“There are several advantages to a totality of circumstances, multi-factor test
. . . .  First, such a test allows for flexibility. . . .  A multi-factor test accepts all
relevant evidence and allows the court to give the evidence the weight the cir-
cumstances deem appropriate.”105
The “middle ground” theory focuses on the entirety of circumstances lead-
ing up to a killing and therefore better balances the values of life and liberty.106
The “middle ground” theory evaluates the surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine the necessity and reasonableness of the non-aggressor’s actions.107  The
“middle ground” theory does not require the non-aggressor to be submissive to
the aggressor until the final moment where escape will be impossible, but the
middle ground theory also does not permit the taking of the aggressor’s life
immediately upon being threatened.108
B. Factors Nevada Should Adopt to Better Determine Self-Defense
After determining that the “middle ground” theory best balances life and
liberty, the question then becomes what factors should a jury consider to deter-
mine consistently and accurately whether the non-aggressor pursued necessary
and reasonable means to save his life?  Nevada should consider the following
factors:  (1) the immediate excitement presented by the assailant; (2) the type of
weapon threatening a person’s life; (3) the demands of the assailant; (4) the
familiarity the non-aggressor has with the surrounding area where the attack
102 See generally Adam J. Katz, Comment, Heinzman v. Mason:  A Decision Based in
Equity but Not an Equitable Decision, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 441, 453 (1999); Vicki
Lawrence MacDougall, Premises Liability After the KFC Case:  Potential Liability of a
Commercial Establishment to a Customer Injured by Provocation of an Armed Robber, 50
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 397, 413 (1996).  “The value of human life outweighs the value
society might place on frustration of crimes and protection of property.”
103 Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs:  The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 703 n.265
(2003).  “There must be a balance between the risk of harm to the defendant . . . and the
value of the life of the attacker.”
104 Cf. Stephanie E. Ord, Note, Ruiz v. Santa Maria:  Defining “Minority Preferred Candi-
date” Within Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 295, 308-09 (2000).
This article focuses mostly on how to define a minority preferred candidate; however, the
advantages of multi-factor tests are the same.
105 Id.  Again, this quote comes from an article discussing minority preferred candidates,
but multi-factor tests in any area of law have the same advantages.
106 See generally id.
107 Smith v. United States, 686 A.2d 537, 544 (D.C. 1996).
108 See id.
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occurred; (5) the familiarity the non-aggressor has with the aggressor; (6) the
number of people endangered; (7) other factors the court deems necessary to
determine the reasonableness and necessity of the non-aggressor’s actions.109
Although some factors might be more influential than other factors, none of
these factors alone will be sufficient in determining whether the defendant’s
actions were necessary and reasonable under the circumstances.
1. The Immediate Excitement Presented by the Aggressor
The purpose of this factor is to help determine the mindset of the non-
aggressor.  When placed in dangerous situations, more often than not, humans
act instinctively rather than logically.110  The more sudden and surprising the
attack, the less likely the non-aggressor will make the most reasonable choice
because he will be required to act quickly, usually on instinct, rather than on
thoughtful evaluation of the circumstances.111  Conversely, a person who antic-
ipates that a crime will be committed against him in the future will have more
time to make a reasonable decision, diffuse the situation, and seek appropriate
means of protection from the state.112
2. The Type of Weapon Threatening Life
Attackers use a variety of weapons to coerce victims to submit to their
demands.113  Some weapons are much more dangerous than others and there-
fore more greatly threaten a person’s liberties and life.114  Victims are more
justified in killing aggressors who wield weapons that can inflict immediate
death upon single use than killing aggressors who wield weapons that can only
kill with continued use on the victim.
For example, generally guns and bombs are more dangerous to a non-
aggressor than brass knuckles, ropes, and knives.  This is the case for two main
reasons.  First, one bullet can easily kill a person, whereas brass knuckles and
knives will usually take a couple of blows before a person’s life will be in
serious danger.  (However, other factors that will be discussed later will deter-
109 The last factor will only be briefly discussed, but it is included because every situation
will be different and using a certain set of factors for every case will defeat the purpose of
coming to the most accurate and fair result depending upon the circumstances.  It should also
be noted that I did not gather these factors from any one source.  I derived them by thinking
about the various circumstances in which a person might claim self-defense.  Although I was
able to find some support for these factors, I first determined the factors and then searched
for support.  Most of the factors are based on common sense arguments.
110 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 754 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Colo. 1988); People v. Wood, 320
N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 301 (Ohio 1984).
111 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1990) (Rose, J., concurring).  Immediacy is
one factor that Justice Rose believes should be evaluated in determining self-defense.
112 James Fayette, “If You Knew Him Like I Did, You’d Have Shot Him Too . . .”  A Survey
of Alaska’s Law of Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 171, 200 (2006).  This reference is
specifically dealing with abused spouses killing their sleeping partner.  Self-defense is not a
valid justification for the killing in such circumstances.  Paul v. State, 655 P.2d 772, 778 n.8
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982).  Another situation where the crime will be conducted in the future
includes threats and crimes conducted on known specific dates.
113 Susan B. Sorenson & Douglas J. Wiebe, Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412, 1412 (2004).
114 See id.
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mine the true threat of the weapon.)  The size and type of the knife or brass
knuckles might make them more or less dangerous.  Further, one must take into
account the size and strength of the aggressor.  If the aggressor is a 275-pound
body builder, brass knuckles and knives become more dangerous than they are
in the hands of a 125-pound grandmother suffering from arthritis.
The second reason that guns tend to be more dangerous than ropes and
knives is the distance necessary to injure the non-aggressor.  If the weapon
requires close proximity to inflict injury and threaten death, then retreat
becomes a more viable option for the non-aggressor so long as the aggressor is
not within range to use the weapon.
[R]etreat to the wall[ ] had its origin before the general introduction of firearms.  If a
person is threatened with death or great bodily harm by an assailant, armed with a
modern rifle, in open space, away from safety, it would be ridiculous to require him
to retreat.  Indeed, to retreat would be to invite almost certain death.115
Although every weapon or object may eventually justify the non-aggressor
in killing his assailant, obviously some weapons present a more compelling
clear and present danger to the non-aggressor.  The more dangerous the
weapon, the less reasonable and necessary it is to require the non-aggressor to
retreat.
3. The Demands of the Aggressor
This factor aids jurors in determining how much liberty the non-aggressor
must surrender before using lethal force against his aggressor.116  The more
unreasonable and dangerous the demand of the aggressor, the more reasonable
self-defense becomes.117  If the demand greatly endangers or limits the liberty
of the non-aggressor, then retreat and compliance are less necessary because a
non-aggressor is not required to forfeit all of his liberties before defending with
lethal force.118
For example, when an assailant is threatening rape, the non-aggressor need
not comply, but is able to protect herself to the death because of the severe
infringement on her liberty and life.119  Whereas, if the assailant is robbing the
non-aggressor of his money, the infringement on his liberty is not so great and
therefore killing the aggressor in self-defense is less justified.120  In fact, the
police suggest that victims of robbery comply with the robber’s demands rather
than escalate a confrontation.121  Here, the jury will need to determine the
necessity of using lethal force with regard to the infringement on a person’s
liberty.  The more harsh and severe the threat to a person’s liberty, the more
justified the non-aggressor is in using lethal force.
115 Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412, 414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
116 See Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317
(2006).
117 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 543 (2005).
118 See generally id.
119 Chiu, supra note 116, at 1344-45.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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4. The Non-Aggressor’s Familiarity with the Place Where the Attack
Occurred
A non-aggressor has a smaller chance of retreating in safety if the non-
aggressor does not know where safety is.122  The more familiar the non-aggres-
sor is with the surroundings where the original attack occurs, the less necessary
and reasonable it is for the non-aggressor to kill the aggressor because he has
more knowledge of where safety lies.123
A person confronted in his own neighborhood is more likely to receive aid
if he runs or screams for help because the non-aggressor is more likely to know
who can provide that assistance, and, in addition, the neighbors are more likely
to recognize him and therefore be more willing to help him.124  This has been
particularly true in public housing communities.125  For instance, “Unique Gib-
son, a public housing resident on Chicago’s Far South Side, said that many
public housing residents ‘want to stay in the areas they know, that aren’t far
from their comfort zone. . . .  They don’t want to go where there is no one there
to catch them [if they fall].’”126
If the attack occurs in a different town or even in an unfamiliar neighbor-
hood or building, the non-aggressor might not know whom he can trust for help
and might not even know where the nearest hospital is if he is injured in his
attempt to retreat.  If the non-aggressor is completely unfamiliar with the sur-
roundings, he might not even be able to give the police a correct description of
where the attack occurred, or is occurring, so the police can aid him.  For these
reasons, the more unfamiliar the non-aggressor is with his immediate surround-
ings, the more unlikely he can safely retreat.
122 See Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).  Escape should be a factor to
consider. See also 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 206 (2006).
123 However, as discussed earlier, a person need not flee from the safety of his own home.
Aggergaard, supra note 9, at 664-65; cf. Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick:  The
Fourth Amendment—Another Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 601, 620
n.118.  Distinguishing two immigration cases, the author Rowley identified one difference
that “the employees were approached in familiar surroundings, reducing the threatening
nature of the encounter.”  I realize that self-defense and immigration cases are not compati-
bly comparable; however, both deal with one’s liberties and freedom to find a safer place.  In
this respect, it is my opinion that the two are comparable.
124 See generally Molly Thompson, Relocating from the Distress of Chicago Public Hous-
ing to the Difficulties of the Private Market:  How the Move Threatens to Push Families
Away from Opportunity, 1 NW J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 267, 284-85 (2006). This particular
section of the article discusses the difficulty of moving from one public housing complex to
another.  These moving people must cope with the fear of unknown neighbors and unknown
crime in the area.  There is a concern that moving will detach them from their “familiar
surroundings and social networks.”
125 See generally id.
126 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Kate N. Grossman, More CHA Residents Are Moving
Up; But ‘Low Poverty’ Relocations Have Pitfalls, Officials Say, CHI. SUN TIMES, Mar. 20,
2005, at 15).
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5. The Familiarity the Non-Aggressor Has with the Aggressor
A large portion of victims know their assailant.127  This factor is intended
to require the victim to consider his assailant’s personality and intentions
before killing the assailant.  A victim who knows the aggressor will have a
better understanding of the seriousness of the situation or will know how to
defuse the situation entirely.  In 2005, the Department of Justice reported that
of the almost five million crime victims (4,718,330) in the United States, nearly
half of the victims (47.7%) knew their assailant.128  A comment in the Journal
of Juvenile Law reported that over 40% of child victims of sexual abuse knew
their assailant,129 and the Department of Justice reported that 22% of all
murders in 2002 were family murders.130  The question the jury must answer
under this factor is whether the previous knowledge about and relationship with
the aggressor should have reasonably changed the non-agressor’s reaction.
The Nevada Supreme Court suggested that the acquaintance the non-
aggressor has with his assailant is a factor the jury may consider.131  In Robi-
son, the defendant knew his aggressor from childhood and “knew that it was
his custom to go unarmed.”132  Knowing such intimate and distinct facts about
a person’s particular aggressor will lessen or enhance the actual level of danger
in which the non-aggressor finds himself.133
If the two people involved in the confrontation are (or were) more than
casual acquaintances, then not only will the non-aggressor know the habits and
skills of his aggressor, but he also is more capable of determining the danger
and seriousness of the situation.134  The non-aggressor might even be able to
reduce, minimize, or extinguish the tension and severity of the situation.
This is true for a few reasons.  First, if the non-aggressor knows his
aggressor, he also presumably knows what caused this confrontation.  The non-
aggressor is more likely to know how angry or serious his assailant is.  He will
be more familiar with the assailant’s tone of voice, physical gestures, and other
actions.  On the other hand, a non-aggressor who is familiar with his assailant
might know that the demands are not serious and therefore not feel so
threatened.
Second, people familiar with one another presumably are more likely to
talk and listen to one another than to strangers.  In such situations, rational
discussion might be able to conclude the threatening situation with little or no
injury to either person.135
127 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Table 27:  Personal Crimes of
Violence (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus/current/cv0527.pdf.
128 Id.
129 Marisa Mortensen, Comment, GPS Monitoring:  An Ingenious Solution to the Threat
Pedophiles Pose to California’s Children, 27 J. JUV. L. 17, 23-24 (2006).
130 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Family Violence Statistics:
Including Statistics on Strangers and Acquaintances, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/
fvs.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
131 State v. Robison, 6 P.2d 433, 438 (Nev. 1931).
132 Id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 This is simply a common sense argument based upon everyday experience and common
knowledge. See generally People v. Salcido, No. A097014, 2004 WL 1192445 (Cal. Ct.
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Third, the familiar non-aggressor also will better know the agility and skill
of the aggressor.  For example, the familiar non-aggressor will more likely
know if the aggressor has ever handled a weapon before and whether this is his
first lethal confrontation.  The more familiar they are with one another, the
more likely the non-aggressor will know whether the aggressor has a real desire
to inflict harm or is even physically able to force the non-aggressor to fulfill the
demand.
Obviously, the familiarity of the non-aggressor with his aggressor must be
more than a one-time introduction at a company party.136  However, if the only
time the non-aggressor met the aggressor, he witnessed or learned of the
aggressor’s violence and anger, then the non-aggressor would be more justified
in using lethal force because he would recognize the imminence of the danger.
To justify a failure to retreat, the non-aggressor must know something about the
aggressor that would change a reasonable person’s actions in a similar
situation.
6. Number of People in Danger
The more people endangered by the aggressor’s actions, the less necessary
retreat is.  This might seem counterintuitive in the sense that if there are so
many people in danger, then certainly the aggressor will not be able to limit
everyone’s liberty.  However, it can be safely assumed that aggressors do not
attack a group of people, unless they believe they have sufficient power to force
all into submission.137  If an aggressor does not believe this to be the case, then
it must be assumed that either the aggressor is not thinking rationally or he does
not want anything from the potential victims except confrontation, which will
naturally result.138
An aggressor simply seeking confrontation is acting so irrationally that
rational attempts to defuse the situation are futile and people must be able to
confront the aggressor with any means necessary, including lethal force.139
Therefore, generally, it must be assumed that the rational aggressor believes,
whether correctly or not, that he will be able to enforce submission by all.140
In terms of numbers, when fewer aggressors are threatening more non-
aggressors, then it is more reasonable for non-aggressors to kill their aggressors
App. May 28, 2004).  This case permitted common knowledge and everyday experience to
persuade a jury.
136 See Robison, 6 P.2d at 438.
137 See George J. Benston & Frank J. Vandall, Legal Control over the Supply of Handguns:
An Analysis of the Issues, with Particular Attention to the Law and Economics of the Hamil-
ton v. Beretta Lawsuit Against Handgun Manufacturers, 26 PACE L. REV. 305, 341 (2006).
138 E.g., Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52 (Nev. 2000); Robison, 6 P.2d 433; State v. Grimmett,
112 P. 273 (Nev. 1910).
139 Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity Defense:  Reflec-
tions on the Exculpatory Scope of Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates Trial, 30
AM. J CRIM. L. 315, 330 (2003).
140 Benston & Vandall, supra note 137, at 341.  “[T]hey must either use violence or its
threat to expand or defend their share of illegal markets.”  This is particularly true in rape
cases.  Comonwealth v. Minor, 591 S.E.2d 61, 66 (Va. 2004).  “Simply put, the other crimes
evidence here showed the defendant’s intent, in each instance, to force the victim to submit
to sexual contacts of various sorts, regardless of the victim’s wishes.”
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rather than retreat.141  Again, this might seem counterintuitive because if there
are so many potential victims, then retreat and escape are more likely simply
due to the sheer numbers of potential victims involved.  The concern with this
reasoning is not that some individuals can retreat in complete safety, but
instead it is the aggregate of all the non-aggressors’ potential to flee in com-
plete safety.  It will be much more difficult for every non-aggressor to retreat in
complete safety because the aggressor need subdue only one person to retain
his superiority, require submission, and accomplish his objectives.142
Further, if the aggressor becomes angry at the possible loss of control he
has over the situation, he might become more inclined to act irrationally in an
attempt to regain control, which might lead to him killing a non-aggressor.  If
anyone should lose his life, it should be the aggressor who initiated the violent
situation rather than a victim the aggressor believed he could manipulate.  For
these reasons, the more people the aggressor is threatening, the less necessary
and reasonable retreat is because of the number of lives being threatened.
7. Other Factors the Judge Believes Will Aid the Jury in Determining
the Necessity and Reasonableness in the Particular Case
As the Nevada Supreme Court decided in Runion, each case will have its
own peculiarities due to the actors and circumstances and therefore “‘stock’
instructions” are not appropriate.143  If the jury needs to evaluate each case
differently with more factors, such as the intoxication of the aggressor, then
common sense, fairness, and justice should guide a judge when deciding how
the additional factors will aid the jury in determining the reasonableness and
necessity of retreat.  For example, if a judge believes that the intoxication of the
aggressor is important in determining whether retreat was an option, then the
intoxication factor would likely make it more probable that the non-aggressor
could retreat from the situation rather than kill his assailant because of the
aggressor’s lessened control over his faculties.144
C. Summary and Final Thoughts on the Seven Factors
Two elements that Nevada requires to prove self-defense are (1) that the
potential victim had a reasonable apprehension of danger145 and (2) that it was
necessary for the potential victim to use lethal force.146  The purpose of the
factors briefly examined above is to aid the jury in determining the necessity of
killing another person.  These seven factors are not exhaustive when determin-
ing the necessity of retreat.  No one factor should be conclusive, and the jury
need not weigh each factor equally.
141 See Hanks v. Jackson, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1074 (E.D. Mich. 2000); see also State v.
Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 675 (Minn. 2003).
142 E.g., Jeffrey E. Zinsmeister, Comment, In Rem Actions Under U.S. Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion as an Effective Means of Obtaining Thirteenth Amendment Relief to Combat Modern
Slavery, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1249, 1283 n.263 (2005).
143 Runion, 13 P.3d at 58-59.
144 ADIC, Effects of Alcohol Intoxication, http://www.indiana.edu/~adic/effects.html (last
visited Feb. 9, 2008).
145 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 239 (Nev. 1990).
146 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200 (2007).
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The major difference between the proposed middle ground theory and the
duty to retreat theory is that in duty to retreat jurisdictions, you must retreat if
escape in complete safety is reasonably possible.147  This proposed middle
ground factor theory is designed so that even though retreat is reasonably possi-
ble, if life and liberties are in sufficient danger, a person may use lethal force to
defend himself or others.  Most people do not know whether they can retreat in
complete safety until they attempt to escape and either free themselves or
receive a bullet in the back.148  The purpose of the proposed factor theory is to
create a standard that is more malleable to the specific circumstances in order
to balance better the importance of a person’s life and liberty.
This proposed factor theory of retreat balances the actual danger presented
and the reasonableness and necessity of retreat to determine whether the non-
aggressor truly acted in self-defense.  This theory is preferable because it does
not require the non-aggressor to submit to the aggressor until retreat is no
longer viable, but it also does not permit the killing of another human or an
escalation of events that leads to a killing simply because the non-aggressor’s
liberties are momentarily limited.
This proposed factor theory for Nevada also purports that the greater the
loss of liberty, the greater justification the non-aggressor has in killing his
aggressor.  This theory requires the jury to determine whether the non-aggres-
sor acted in self-defense.  It simply guides the jury in how logically to come to
a conclusion and requires them to balance the loss of life and the loss of liberty.
IV. DIFFICULTIES FACING THE NEVADA COMMON LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE IF
NEVADA WERE TO ADOPT THIS MIDDLE GROUND
FACTOR THEORY
The common-law change from the true-man doctrine to a more middle
ground factor approach does not need to be complicated and time consum-
ing.149  The first suggestion to make a smooth and quick transition is to petition
the Nevada Legislature to pass a statute enacting the above-mentioned factors
rather than allowing the common law to adopt such a system.
This change will be fairly monumental and significant in determining
whether a person acted in self-defense.  Requesting the Nevada Legislature to
adopt such an important change will be the least prejudicial to defendants
because in that way the change will not surprise defendants.  Further, a defen-
dant and his attorney who lacked any notice that the trial judge decided to
utilize the proposed middle ground theory rather than the pre-established true-
man doctrine of self-defense are prejudiced.  For the judge to simply change the
applicable criminal standard violates the defendant’s due process rights.150
147 People v. Fermin, 828 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 2007).
148 E.g., Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 2006).
149 See, e.g., Alabama Legislature to Consider Self-defense Bill, GOTTLIEB-TARTARO REP.,
Dec. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.saf.org/gt/gt132.pdf.  The Gottlieb-Tartaro Report
reported that Alabama was going to contact Florida to avoid any obstacles in becoming a
“no-retreat” jurisdiction.  Nevada can contact a number of states to discuss how best to avoid
problems involved with altering the self-defense standard.
150 United States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 920 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1964)).
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In addition, if Nevada waited until the courts made the changes, then this
transition could take several years and probably even decades before the judges
could reasonably morph the true-man doctrine into the middle ground the-
ory.151  This change is not a simple or subtle evolution in the common law,
and, hence, for reasons of jurisprudence and stare decisis, the Nevada Legisla-
ture should pass a bill making the transition.
Regardless of whether the Nevada Legislature adopts the proposed middle
ground factors, Nevada should amend the self-defense statute to clarify the con-
trolling self-defense theory.  Currently the Nevada self-defense statute reads,
“[I]t must appear that . . . [t]he danger was so urgent and pressing that, in order
to save his own life, . . . the killing of the other was absolutely necessary.”152
This is not a true-man standard. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “absolute” as
“[f]ree from restriction, qualification, or condition.”153  “Absolutely neces-
sary,” from its plain meaning, must mean that the necessity of the killing must
be completely, without qualification, necessary.  A killing can only be “abso-
lutely necessary” if killing is the only option.  From the plain meaning of the
statute, how can a killing ever be “absolutely necessary” if another alternative,
such as retreat, exists?
The wording of the Nevada statute currently requires the victim to retreat,
even though that is not the way courts apply the statute.154  In Runion v. State,
the Nevada Supreme Court declared:
While the phrase “absolutely necessary” seems to indicate that self-defense is a justi-
fication for homicide where a person is actually in imminent danger, the use of the
word “appear” implies that self-defense may be a justification for homicide in
instances where a person reasonably believes that he is about to be seriously injured
or killed but he is mistaken in that belief.155
Why the court emphasized “appear” more than “absolutely” is unclear, but this
is how the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the Nevada self-defense stat-
ute, even though at first glance it might seem that Nevada requires its citizens
to retreat rather than engage in lethal conflict when a person’s life is in dan-
ger.156  Regardless of whether the Nevada Legislature adopts the middle
ground factors, it should amend the current and unclearly written self-defense
statute.
The separation of powers within the Nevada Constitution gives the power
of creating new laws to the Nevada Legislature.157  It is not the court’s preroga-
tive, duty, or responsibility to change or create law.158  Courts are authorized to
interpret the laws that the Nevada Legislature has enacted.159  Further, citizens,
151 It was not until 1876 that a state court developed a new self-defense standard.  It took
over 100 years for the standard to evolve fully. See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).
152 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200 (2007) (emphasis added).
153 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 7 (8th ed. 2004).
154 NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.200.
155 Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52, 56 (Nev. 2000).
156 Id.
157 NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
158 Id.
159 See id. art. 6.
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through their representatives, should determine whether the middle ground fac-
tors are preferred over the true-man doctrine.160
There are at least three concerns that Nevada might have with adopting a
middle ground factor test:  (1) increased confusion because the statute will not
be as clear as the current Nevada standard that does not require retreat; (2) the
proposed middle ground theory is too complicated for juries to efficiently util-
ize; and (3) there will be an increase in the number of cases being tried in the
Nevada courts.  Although each of these concerns has some validity, none out-
weighs the need to change the law in order to preserve a person’s life under
some circumstances.  The proposed middle ground theory is a rational attempt
to balance the loss of liberty and the loss of life and ensure the most just result.
A. Increased Confusion Due to the Lack of Clarity
Although the application of the Nevada true-man doctrine appears more
clear and simple than the middle ground theory, it is not any easier to analyze.
The true-man doctrine only requires the defendant to prove that a reasonable
person in similar circumstances would believe that the aggressor would take his
life or cause great bodily harm.161  However, the analysis for the jury is a little
more complicated.  The true-man standard requires the jury to evaluate the
actual or apparent danger.162  Specifically, the jury must determine whether the
danger “arouse[d] in [the defendant’s] mind an honest belief and fear that he is
about to be killed or suffer great bodily injury,”163 whether “[the defendant]
act[ed] solely upon these appearances and his fear and actual beliefs,”164 and
whether “[a] reasonable person in a similar situation would believe himself to
be in like danger.”165  These are the guidelines given to juries before they
deliberate.  The true-man standard gives jurors some guidance, but the guide-
lines are very broad and malleable, which can be very confusing to a juror.
The factors proposed in the middle ground theory are an attempt to require
jurors to analyze factor-by-factor in comprehending the dangers of the situa-
tion, in deciding whether the defendant reasonably and necessarily acted in
self-defense, and in eventually coming to a conclusion.  These factors give the
jurors specific facts to evaluate that will aid them in their conclusion.  Jurors
will still be able to bring their experiences into their deliberation, but giving
them some factors with which to analyze the facts should help clarify the con-
fusion of a trial and help them come to a just conclusion.  The factors might not
be as clear as the general true-man rule that a non-aggressor can kill his aggres-
sor when his life is threatened, but the rule is not nearly as important as the
accuracy of the analysis.
160 See id. art 4, § 1.
161 Runion, 13 P.3d at 55.
162 Id. at 56.
163 Id. at 59.
164 Id. This factor tends to coincide with the initial factor of determining whether the defen-
dant was actually in danger rather than acting out of preconceived conceptions of the original
aggressor.
165 Id.
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B. A Jury Is Incapable of Comprehending or Implementing Such a
Complicated Standard of Factors
In Culverson, Justice Rose wrote a concurring opinion that disagreed with
the majority opinion that juries are incapable of determining whether “a reason-
able person should know that he or she could retreat without using deadly
force.”166  Justice Rose pointed out that “[a] jury is required to make many
difficult decisions.”167  In the course of a trial, the jury must decide a variety of
difficult issues that determine the outcome of the case.168
In fact, Nevada courts have realized that every self-defense case will be
different and therefore the jury instructions should rarely be the same.169
“[Nevada] district courts should tailor instructions to the facts and circum-
stances of a case, rather than simply relying on ‘stock’ instructions.”170  All of
these decisions and jury instructions are a little complicated, yet the jury system
has survived for several centuries now.171
Even if the majority in Culverson was correct to posit that the jury is not
apt to determine correctly whether the defendant could have safely retreated,
one possible reason for this lack of capability is that the law has not provided a
proper path to follow that will guide the jurors through the analysis.  The mid-
dle ground factors provide more guidance.  If jurors become confused, lawyers
can utilize “[a]n experienced expert [to] explain behaviors that jurors often find
baffling.”172
In addition, because attorneys will know that the jury will be using a num-
ber of significant factors in making a conclusion, they will present the evidence
supporting the factors more effectively to persuade the jury accordingly.
Hence, not only will the factors guide the jury’s reasoning, they will also guide
the attorneys in their manner of presenting evidence.  Juries will not be making
inferences and assumptions on evidence never presented.  The relevant factors
will aid the jury in its process of determining whether the defendant acted in
self-defense.
C. Likelihood of More Cases Requiring More Time to Conclude
Some will argue that going through an in-depth analysis of each of the
factors will greatly extend the time required for a trial.173  Not only will each
case consume more time, but more cases will be filed and tried because if there
166 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 242 (Rose, J., concurring).
167 Id.
168 See generally id.
169 Runion, 13 P.3d at 58-59.
170 Id. at 59.
171 See Stephen Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285,
288 (1999) (“The United States’s allegiance to the civil jury is the product both of its early
colonial history and the constitutional debates at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War.
The jury trial came to the New World with the English colonists and was, from the earliest
times, the established means of resolving legal disputes.”) (footnote omitted)).
172 Jennifer Gentile Long, Explaining Counterintuitive Victim Behavior in Domestic Vio-
lence and Sexual Assault Cases, PROSECUTOR, Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 12, 14.
173 This is a common sense argument.  There is not really any empirical evidence to show
what would definitively happen because Nevada has not adopted such a standard; therefore
this analysis is simply weighing the advantages and possibilities on both sides.
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is a question of whether the defendant could have retreated, a trial will ensue
due to the consequences at stake.  Both of these results will slow an already
overworked judicial branch174 to the point where the factors are no longer ben-
eficial to society.
Although there might be some truth that more cases will be brought to
trial, therefore requiring more judicial resources, the impact on the courts might
not be as great as one would think.  The assumption that trials will take more
time to conclude arises from the belief that the parties are going to need more
time to introduce evidence to prove each factor.  It is true that each party will
desire to prove each factor, but it will not require a lot more time because most
of the evidence that attorneys will present would be presented regardless of
which standard Nevada used.  The factors are designed to use the circum-
stances and facts to determine whether the defendant acted in necessity.
Just because the analysis is different does not necessarily mean that the
amount of evidence needed to prove self-defense would change.  One of the
desired outcomes from using these proposed factors is that the jury will become
more efficient in reaching a verdict because the jury will be analyzing smaller
aspects of the bigger picture.  The jury will then be able to put the smaller
pieces together to see the big picture and determine the appropriate verdict.
These factors will only be tools to aid jurors in analyzing the overall situation.
The current standard only requires the jurors to see the big picture.  The differ-
ence is that the factors dissect the situation, requiring jurors to make determina-
tions on smaller aspects of the overall picture.  The time needed at trial to prove
or disprove self-defense will unlikely be significantly greater.
The second point, that the district attorney’s office will file more cases, is
likely true because the key issue will not be whether the defendant was faced
with a life or death situation, but instead whether killing the person was neces-
sary and reasonable.175  This issue may be more difficult to decide until discov-
ery has occurred and more facts are revealed.  However, two safeguards will
prevent a large increase in cases filed.  First, district attorneys and other state
officials are unlikely to waste limited resources of time and money on frivolous
claims.  “Nevada . . . police and prosecutors . . . have generally shown the
common sense to forgo prosecuting crime victims who defend themselves.”176
Just because one person killed another does not necessarily mean that the dis-
trict attorney will prosecute the defendant to the fullest extent possible.
174 In 2004, Nevada courts, including both criminal and civil, had a total of 1,004,583
cases incoming.  In that same time, the Nevada courts had 807,592 cases outgoing.  Nevada
courts are completing about 80% of the caseload. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE
COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2005, at tbl. 2 (2006), available at http://
www.ncsconline.org/D_res earch/csp/2005_files/State%20Court%20Caseload%20Statistics
%202005.pdf.  In 2004, 149,096 criminal cases were filed in Nevada.  The Nevada courts
were only able to complete 99,890 cases. Id. at tbl. 6.  These numbers are not completely
accurate because a few of the courts did not report their entire incoming and outgoing
caseload.  Some courts only reported either their incoming or their outgoing caseload. Id. at
tbl. 2.
175 Again, because Nevada has not enacted such a statute, I am only speculating about what
might happen.  This portion is only articulating some likely concerns.
176 Editorial, News from the Pro-Crime Lobby:  Group Fights Against the Concept of Self-
Defense, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 5, 2006, at 6B.
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This introduces the second safeguard, which is that after the district attor-
ney files a case, the prosecutor can drop the charges and the case at any point in
the litigation.177  As more facts are revealed through discovery, the district
attorney may realize the innocence of the defendant and voluntarily dismiss the
claims.  Further, because the district attorney will know precisely what factors
the jury will be evaluating, it is possible that he will benefit because he will
better be able to comprehend how strong his case against the defendant really is
rather than guessing on how the jury is going to interpret and analyze the evi-
dence presented.
These questions about time are serious considerations that Nevada must
ponder because there will likely be an increase in the resources devoted to
prosecuting defendants.178  The question to ask is, “How much of Nevada’s
resources should be used to determine whether a person murdered another per-
son or whether he killed him in self-defense to preserve his life and liberties?”
If utilizing the middle ground factors will require more judicial resources than
Nevada is willing to invest, then maybe it is best to continue employing the no-
retreat doctrine.  But if Nevada believes that coming to the best decision in a
homicide case is more important, then Nevada will benefit by implementing the
middle ground factors.
V. CONCLUSION
Necessity is the only reason a person should kill another human.179  The
duty to retreat doctrine is an unreasonable standard because it is nearly impossi-
ble to evaluate whether a defendant could have retreated in complete safety “in
the presence of an uplifted knife.”180  The no-retreat doctrine is irrational
because it permits the most drastic means of determent—lethal force—without
reflection about other options and the true danger confronting a defendant.181
Both opposing doctrines do not focus on the reasonable necessity of killing
another person.182  Hence, the best standard is the proposed middle ground the-
ory with which the jury will evaluate each case separately according to the
unique objective facts to determine necessity.
Nevada should adopt the following seven factors:  (1) immediacy of the
excitement, (2) type of weapon threatening life, (3) the demand of the aggres-
sor, (4) the familiarity the non-aggressor has with the place of attack, (5) the
familiarity the non-aggressor has with the aggressor, (6) the number of people
in danger, and (7) other factors the judge believes will aid the jury in determin-
ing self-defense.  These factors will assist the jury in determining the necessity
177 FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
178 Again, this is just a common sense economical argument that the more cases a lawyer
files the greater the amount of resources the lawyer will need.
179 See State v. Cox, 23 A.2d 634, 642 (Me. 1941).
180 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
181 See generally Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52, 56 (Nev. 2000).  The defendant acts in self-
defense “where [he] reasonably believes that he is about to be seriously injured or killed but
he is mistaken in that belief.”
182 See generally Brown, 256 U.S. 335.
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and reasonableness of killing another person, which are the true measures of
self-defense.183
Even if Nevada decides not to accept this proposed middle ground factor
test, Nevada will benefit from creating a list of factors for a jury to evaluate
under the current no-retreat standard because factors give more guidance to
jurors to ensure that they come to a more just conclusion, especially when the
particular facts of the event are so important.184  “In laying down a rule for the
government of a jury, accuracy, clearness, and precision should be studied and
sought after . . . to render it a safe and certain guide.”185  The proposed factor
test is an attempt to make the verdicts more accurate, clear, and precise.
183 See generally Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1990).
184 See Response, Professor Laurence Tribe’s Response, 28 PEPP. L REV. 537, 542 (2001).
Professor Chemerinsky thinks “balancing factors are inherent to any reasonableness and
totality of the circumstances test that doesn’t lend itself to bright-line rules, but it has to be
fact specific.”
185 Farrish v. State, 63 Ala. 164 (1879).
